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A FLY IN THE OINTMENT: PROMESA’S DRAFTING ERROR 
IN SECTION 314(b)(7) 
ABSTRACT 
When Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, Congress precluded 
Puerto Rico from seeking bankruptcy relief under chapter 9 (municipal 
bankruptcy). There is no satisfactory explanation for the exclusion because no 
legislative history exists to offer an explanation. Embroiled in a $123 billion 
debt crisis1 and left without a remedy, Puerto Rico enacted its own municipal 
bankruptcy law in 2014, in an effort to restructure some of its public debts.  
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,2 the U.S. Supreme 
Court conclusively held that § 903 of the Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto 
Rico’s own municipal bankruptcy law.3 Recognizing that Puerto Rico was truly 
left “in a no man’s land,” Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight 
Management and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”) in 2016 to assist 
Puerto Rico in restructuring its debts. PROMESA uniquely established the 
Financial Oversight and Management Board (“Oversight Board”) to provide a 
method for Puerto Rico to achieve fiscal responsibility. The Oversight Board 
has the sole discretion to determine whether a plan of adjustment is consistent 
with an applicable certified Fiscal Plan.  
An internal inconsistency exists in PROMESA despite the apparent 
dichotomous roles of the Oversight Board and the court. Section 314(b)(7) 
hinders the efficiency of the bankruptcy system for two reasons. First, it gives 
the district court a meaningless power by inadvertently permitting the court to 
determine whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal 
Plan. Second, it negates the sole discretionary authority of the Oversight Board. 
To effectuate the fundamental goal of a bankruptcy proceeding, § 314(b)(7) of 
PROMESA should be removed to resolve the conflict it creates. 
  
 
 1 Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-puerto-rico-debt-crisis/. 
 2 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 3 Id. at 1940. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The U.S. Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust4 bifurcated the definition of “State” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code 
(“Code”). If Puerto Rico were considered a “State” for all purposes, perhaps its 
fate would have been different today. The Court concluded that, while Puerto 
Rico is a “State” subject to the preemption provision in § 903 of the Code, Puerto 
is not a “State” for purposes of who may be a debtor under chapter 9 (municipal 
bankruptcy).5 In fact, § 101(52) of the Code specifically excludes Puerto Rico 
and the District of Columbia from being able to seek federal bankruptcy relief.6 
This raises the question: why? The truth is that Puerto Rico’s anomalous 
treatment in the Code had neither attracted much of Congress’s attention7 nor 
been questioned until Puerto Rico was actually buried in debt.  
No legislative history explains Congress’s decision to exclude Puerto Rico 
from seeking federal bankruptcy relief.8 However, there are several theories that 
suggest Congress’s rationale for doing so. One such theory is that Congress 
“goofed” when it amended the Code in 1984.9 Another theory suggests that 
Congress may have wanted to protect American investors in the U.S. mainland 
by preventing Puerto Rico from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy laws that 
“may or may not treat their nationwide creditors fairly.”10 
Realizing Puerto Rico’s anomalous position of not being able to enact its 
own municipal bankruptcy laws, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight 
Management and Stability Act (“PROMESA”) and established the Financial 
Oversight and Management Board (“Oversight Board”) to provide the indebted 
island an avenue of bankruptcy-like relief.11 In general, the Oversight Board is 
charged with providing a method to achieve Puerto Rico’s fiscal responsibility 
 
 4 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938. 
 5 Id. at 1946. 
 6 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012). 
 7 Stephen Mihm, Bankruptcy was Option for Puerto Rico Before Congress Goof, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-12-03/bankruptcy-was-option-for-puerto-rico-
before-congress-goof. 
 8 Id. (quoting Kenneth Klee’s testimony). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Fights for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy in Supreme Court, N.Y TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-fights-for-chapter-9-
bankruptcy-in-supreme-court.html (quoting Matthew McGill, attorney who represented the creditors in Puerto 
Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust). 
 11 Stephen Perez-Nuño, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 
29, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-act-puerto-rico-debt-crisis-
n601291. 
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and economic growth.12 The district court for the covered territory is charged 
with confirming a debt restructuring plan for the treatment of different classes 
of creditors against Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities (“plan of adjustment” 
or “plan”).13 
At a macro level, the fundamental purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws is 
to give debtors a “fresh start” from burdensome debts.14 At a micro level, the 
statutory goal of a debt reorganization case under the Code is to get a plan of 
reorganization15 confirmed by the court. It can be argued that the statutory goal 
of a debt adjustment case under PROMESA is to get a plan of adjustment 
confirmed by a district court, which has the original and exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction over all debt adjustment cases.16 
Section 314(b)(7) of PROMESA (“Confirmation”) hinders the efficiency of 
the bankruptcy system because (1) it gives the court a meaningless power by 
inadvertently permitting the court to determine whether a plan of adjustment is 
consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan; and (2) it negates the sole 
discretionary authority of the Oversight Board. Among other requirements, 
§ 314(b) provides that the court shall confirm a plan of adjustment if it is 
consistent with an applicable Fiscal Plan.17 While this may seem innocuous at 
first, the duty to approve and certify a Fiscal Plan is solely reserved to the 
Oversight Board.18 PROMESA makes it quite convincing that it is the Oversight 
Board’s exclusive responsibility to “certify a plan of adjustment only if it 
determines, in its sole discretion, that [the plan] is consistent with the applicable 
certified Fiscal Plan.”19 To effectuate the fundamental goal of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, § 314(b)(7) of PROMESA should be removed from § 314(b) to 
resolve the conflict created by its inclusion. 
This Comment begins by explaining the historical development of American 
municipal bankruptcy law and providing the background facts necessary to 
understand what gave rise to the enactment of PROMESA. Additionally, this 
Comment provides information that offers an insight into the origins of Puerto 
 
 12 PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, Title I, § 2(a), 130 Stat. 553 (2016) (codified as amended at 48 
U.S.C. § 2121(a) (2016)). 
 13 See 48 U.S.C. § 2174. 
 14 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 381 (2007); Process – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics. 
 15 This Comment uses “plan of reorganization” and “plan of adjustment” synonymously.  
 16 48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(1). 
 17 Id. § 2174(b). 
 18 Id. § 2141(c). 
 19 Id. § 2124(j)(3) (emphasis added). 
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Rico’s financial instability and its current economic status. The Analysis Section 
delineates how PROMESA differs from the Code with respect to the plan 
confirmation process. This Comment then deconstructs the language of 
§ 314(b)(7) to demonstrate not only the conflict it creates, but its redundancy. 
Finally, this Comment concludes by offering a way to remove that internal 
inconsistency to maximize the efficiency of the bankruptcy system.  
A. Historical Development of American Municipal Bankruptcy Law 
Before the current Bankruptcy Code became effective in 1978, the first 
federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“Bankruptcy Act”) was the law in place.20 The 
Bankruptcy Act was Congress’s exercise of power to establish a uniform system 
of bankruptcy laws throughout the United States—a power expressly granted by 
the U.S. Constitution.21 Congress’s intent to create a uniform system of 
bankruptcy laws throughout the United States is evidenced by the inclusion of 
“Territories . . . and the District of Columbia” as “States” for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Act,22 which coincides with the year of United States’ annexation 
of Puerto Rico as a U.S. Territory.23 But when Congress codified the laws to 
form the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it decided to remove the definition of “State” 
entirely from the definition section.24 When the Code was amended in 1984, 
Congress reincorporated the definition of “State” with a kicker—it redefined 
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia as “States,” but excluded both from 
being debtors25 under chapter 9 of the Code.26  
Municipal bankruptcy is a relatively recent phenomenon in American 
bankruptcy law.27 Congress enacted the first municipal bankruptcy legislation in 
1934 (“Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation”) as a result of the Great 
 
 20 KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1801−2014, 201 
(1st ed. 2014). 
 21 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to enact uniform laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States); see also Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 22 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).  
 23 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (defining debtor as a “person or municipality concerning which a case under 
this title has been commenced”). 
 26 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (“The term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 
except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”); 2 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 101 (16th ed. 2017); Municipal Bankruptcy—Preemption—Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal 
Reorganization Act— Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act 
No. 71, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 1321–22 (2015). 
 27 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (16th 2018). 
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Depression,28 and the 1934 Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation was added to the 
Bankruptcy Act as Chapter IX.29 Congress was aware of the Municipal 
Bankruptcy Legislation’s potential interference with the sovereign powers of the 
states, as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,30 but 
nonetheless saw the need to provide a remedy to over 1,000 powerless 
municipalities that were in default on their bond payments during the Great 
Depression.31 Prior to this new legislation, municipalities had been unable to 
provide remedies to their creditors because the U.S. Constitution forbade the 
states from impairing obligations of contract.32 After additional revisions to the 
existing Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation, the resulting legislation became a 
permanent part of the Bankruptcy Act in 1946.33 
Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act remained unchanged and unused for 30 
years until 1975, when New York City’s financial crisis during President Gerald 
Ford’s administration provided the impetus for major changes to the Municipal 
Bankruptcy Legislation.34 Chapter IX as it existed was virtually unusable by a 
large city, such as New York City.35 One of the requirements for relief under 
Chapter IX was that 51 percent of creditors had to accept a plan before a petition 
could even be filed.36 This was problematic because a major municipality could 
hardly be expected to even locate 51 percent of its bondholders, due to the sheer 
number.37 After rejecting the Ford administration’s proposed revision to the 
legislation,38 Congress revised Chapter IX for all municipalities throughout the 
United States.39 The 1976 revision was part of the bankruptcy law reform 
process that Congress initiated in 1970, and this process ultimately resulted in 
the enactment of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978.40 
 
 28 Many rural municipalities were unable to meet their interest and principal obligations on their bonds 
due to depressed market and low prices for farm products. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See Ashton v. Cameron County Water District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (holding the Municipal Bankruptcy 
Legislation unconstitutional as an improper interference with the sovereignty of the states). 
 31 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 32 U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl 1; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (16th 2018). 
 33 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 The legislation the Ford administration proposed was limited to the adjustment of debts of 
municipalities with populations of one million or more. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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There is no clear reason for why Congress excluded Puerto Rico from 
seeking relief under chapter 9 of the Code,41 as there is no trace of legislative 
history or indication of Congress’s intent,42 except for the plain language of the 
amended Code. “What explains Congress wanting to put Puerto Rico in this 
anomalous position of not being able to restructure its debt?”43 “Why would 
Congress preclude Puerto Rico from Chapter 9?”44 These are some of the 
questions that Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court asked when arguments were 
presented before the Court for Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust45 in March of 2016. As described in the following paragraphs, several 
theories suggest why Congress barred Puerto Rico from chapter 9 in 1984. 
Since the amendments in 1984, many have asked the question of why 
Congress would want to prevent Puerto Rico from restructuring its debts. This 
is the question that everybody asks, for which there is no answer.46 Matthew 
McGill, the attorney who represented Puerto Rico’s creditors in Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, offered a theory.47 Mr. McGill said that the 
amendment was not that mysterious if one considered Congress’s long history 
of micromanaging Puerto Rico’s indebtedness.48 By 1984, Puerto Rico and the 
District of Columbia49 were the two most indebted territories.50 Congress’s 
encouragement of a widespread purchasing of the tax-exempt Puerto Rican 
bonds may have led Congress to protect American investors by making it hard 
for Puerto Rico to renege or write its own municipal bankruptcy laws.51 
The attorney for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Christopher Landau, 
offered an alternative explanation to the question. Mr. Landau said that “legal 
provisions were being misread, and Congress had not really intended to shut 
 
 41 Congress also excluded District of Columbia from seeking relief under chapter 9 of the Code. See 11 
U.S.C. § 101(52). 
 42 Walsh, supra note 10. 
 43 Id. (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
 44 Id. (quoting Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
 45 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).  
 46 Walsh, supra note 10. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Walsh, supra note 10 (citing a 1917 federal law that limited the amount of debt that Puerto Rico could 
take on). 
 49 In 1995, Congress established the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management 
Assistance Authority (“DC Control Board”) and vested the DC Control Board with broad powers to balance 
Washington’s budget. Jon Bouker, The D.C. Revitalization Act: History, Provisions and Promises, in BUILDING 
THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE WORLD 81, 81–82 (2008) (available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/07/appendix-1.pdf). 
 50 Walsh, supra note 10. 
 51 Id. 
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Puerto Rico out of bankruptcy.”52 A hypothesis that corroborates Mr. Landau’s 
theory is that Congress had simply made a drafting error when it amended the 
Code in 1984.53 The legislators may have excluded Puerto Rico and the District 
of Columbia from access to federal bankruptcy law in a “bizarre oversight,” 
when they redefined the definition of “State.”54 Unfortunately this radical 
change in Puerto Rico’s status—from once being eligible to seek federal 
bankruptcy relief to being excluded after the 1984 amendments—stirred no 
debate or question in Congress until Puerto Rico’s debts recently became 
unsustainable.55 
1. Congress Takes Away Puerto Rico’s Eligibility to File for Municipal 
Bankruptcy 
There are two requirements that must be met to commence a bankruptcy case 
under any operative chapter of the Code.56 The first is that a debtor must have 
capacity to file a bankruptcy petition.57 For example, a legal entity that seeks to 
reorganize its debt under chapter 1158 must be validly existing upon the filing of 
the petition under applicable state law.59 The second requirement is that a debtor 
must be eligible to file a petition.60  
The 1976 revision to the Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation permitted a 
municipality to file a petition under Chapter IX if it was “generally authorized” 
by state law to do so.61 The adoption of the phrase “generally authorized” was 
the result of a compromise between the House version and the Senate version of 
the 1976 Act, in which the Senate had proposed a municipality had to be 
“specifically authorized” by state law to be eligible to file a municipal 
bankruptcy.62 The broad language of “generally authorized” left its 
interpretation open to the courts, as it was not clear how “general” the 
authorization had to be in order for a municipality to satisfy the statutory 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Walsh, supra note 10. 
 54 Mihm, supra note 7. 
 55 Id. 
 56 KLEE & HOLT, supra note 20, at 196. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS 
AND BUSINESSES 25 (4th ed. 2015) (“Chapter 11 contemplates a comprehensive financial restructuring of the 
debtor and that the debtor and creditors will negotiate a plan for payment of creditors that is to be approved by 
the bankruptcy court.”). 
 59 KLEE & HOLT, supra note 20, at 196. 
 60 Id. 
 61 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 62 H.R. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16–17 (1976) (“Conference Report”). 
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requirement.63 While many courts construed the language broadly, the 
bankruptcy court for the Western District of Pennsylvania concluded in 1990 
that a state statute did not give sufficient general authorization to file a 
bankruptcy petition.64 Following this decision, the 1994 Act amended 
§ 109(c)(2) of the Code (“Who may be a debtor”), by deleting the original 
language—“generally authorized”—and replacing it with the Senate’s language 
of the 1976 Act—“specifically authorized.”65  
This amendment effectively negated § 109(c) of the Code, which sets out the 
requirements for whom may be a debtor under chapter 9. Among other statutory 
requirements, § 109(c) provides that an entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 
if and only if the entity is a “municipality” and “is specifically authorized, in its 
capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State 
law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to 
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter . . . .”66 Because Puerto 
Rico cannot specifically authorize its municipality to be a debtor under chapter 
9, since it is not a “State” for purposes of who may be a debtor under chapter 9, 
it became ineligible to commence a municipal bankruptcy case under the Code. 
This then raised a question: Could Puerto Rico enact its own municipal 
bankruptcy laws? 
2. Puerto Rico Cannot Enact its Own Bankruptcy Laws 
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case67 that addressed whether a 
state could enact its own municipal bankruptcy laws, holding that a New Jersey 
municipal bankruptcy statute was not preempted by the federal bankruptcy 
laws.68 The Court’s analysis stemmed from the constitutional analysis of who 
may be a debtor69 in United States v. Bekins.70 In Bekins, a state had authorized—
i.e., gave consent to—its municipality to seek bankruptcy relief under the federal 
 
 63 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 64 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH; see In re Carroll Township Auth., 119 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that that language of the state statute, “to sue, be sued, implead, be impleaded, to 
complain and/or defend in all courts” and “to do all acts and things necessary to convenient for the promotion 
of [their businesses] and the general welfare of the [authorities], and to carry out the powers granted to [them] 
by this act” was inadequate general authorization). 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. 
 66 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1)–(2). 
 67 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Ashbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 68 See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (discussing Faitoute and its holding that the federal 
bankruptcy laws did not preempt New Jersey’s municipal bankruptcy laws, which required municipalities to 
seek relief under state law before resorting to the federal bankruptcy law). 
 69 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). 
 70 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
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bankruptcy laws before the municipality actually filed a petition.71 To override 
the Court’s decision in 1942,72 Congress added a preemption provision, now 
codified in § 903 of the Code (“Reservation of State power to control 
municipalities”), that limits the states’ powers to enact their own municipal 
bankruptcy laws.73 Section 903 of the Code now reads: 
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, 
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the 
exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality, 
including expenditures for such exercise, but—a State law prescribing 
a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not 
bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition . . . .74 
To analyze a chapter 9 case, one must determine whether the debtor is 
eligible to file a municipal bankruptcy75 before determining whether the debtor 
is preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution76 from enacting 
its own municipal bankruptcy laws.77 When a debtor is ineligible to file a chapter 
9 bankruptcy case under § 109(c), then any state law enacted to authorize the 
debtor to seek bankruptcy relief under the Code will be preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.78  
Table A. Section 109 and Section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
§ 109. Who may be a debtor. § 903. Reservation of State power 
to control municipalities. 
(c) An entity may be a debtor under 
chapter 9  
This chapter does not limit or 
impair the 
 of this title if and only if such 
entity— 
power of a State to control, by 
legislation 
 (1) is a municipality; or governmental powers of such 
 
 71 See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (discussing the outcome of Bekins and the Court’s 
constitutional analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)).  
 72 See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. 502. 
 73 See Act of July 1, 1946, 60 Stat. 415 (1946); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 903.LH. 
 74 11 U.S.C. § 903. 
 75 Id. § 109(c). 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 77 11 U.S.C. § 903; see Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (“the provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code defining who may be a debtor under Chapter 9, which [the Court refers to] here as the ‘gateway’ provision, 
requires the States to authorize their municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9 before the municipalities may 
file a Chapter 9 petition . . .”). 
 78 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Municipal Bankruptcy—Preemption—Puerto Rico Passes New 
Municipal Reorganization Act— Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 
P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 1323 (2015) (predicting how the Recovery Act was likely to be 
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause). 
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  as a municipality or by name, 
to be a debtor under such 
chapter by State law, or by a 
governmental officer or 
organization empowered by 
State law to authorize such 
entity to be a debtor under such 
chapter; 
such exercise, but— 
 (1) a State law prescribing a 
method of 
  composition of indebtedness 
of such 
 municipality may not bind 
any 
 creditor that does not consent 
to 
 such composition; and 
 (3) is insolvent;  (2) a judgment entered under 
such a law 
 (4) desires to effect a plan to adjust 
such  
  may not bind a creditor that 
does not 
  debts; and  consent to such 
composition. 
 (5)(A) . . .    
 
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,79 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of § 109(c) (“Who may 
be a debtor”), but that it is a “State” for purposes of § 903 (“Reservation of State 
power to control municipalities”).80 The Court’s conclusion that Puerto Rico is 
not a “State” for purposes of § 109(c) means that Puerto Rico does not have the 
power to authorize its municipalities to seek relief under chapter 9 pursuant to 
§ 109(c)(2).81 Yet the Court concluded that Puerto Rico is “no less a ‘State’ for 
purposes of the preemption provision than it was before Congress amended the 
definition.”82 The bifurcation of the meaning of “State” as applied to different 
provisions in the Code seems absurd, but the language of the Code is clear.83 
Puerto Rico can neither seek relief under chapter 9, nor can it enact its own 
municipal bankruptcy laws. 
 
 79 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938. 
 80 Id..at 1946. 
 81 Id. at 1946. 
 82 Id. at 1947. 
 83 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court and reasoned that the plain text of the Bankruptcy 
Code begins and ends the statutory analysis. See id. at 1946 (2016). 
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Recognizing that Puerto Rico was truly left “in a no man’s land,”84 Congress 
enacted PROMESA in June of 2016 to assist the government of Puerto Rico and 
its instrumentalities in managing its public finances.85 PROMESA established 
the Oversight Board and delegated sweeping powers to the Oversight Board to 
manage Puerto Rico’s fiscal policies. This bill was not met without opposition 
by members of the Congress and the public. Many residents of Puerto Rico 
dubbed the Oversight Board a “Colonial Control Board”86 and the bill itself a 
“Colonial Control Bill.”87 Senator Bob Menendez88 filibustered the bill for four 
hours in opposition before the Senate approved it.89 In a speech before the Senate 
floor, Senator Menendez said: 
Mark my words—if we don’t seize this opportunity to address this 
crisis in a meaningful way, we’ll be right back here in a year from now 
picking up the pieces. So while it’s absolutely clear that we need to act 
and act decisively and expediently to help our fellow citizens in Puerto 
Rico, just as importantly, we need to get this right.90 
The general consensus in Congress, however, was that the bill was a necessary 
compromise to restructure Puerto Rico’s outstanding debts.91  
All of these outcomes are the products of Congress’s decision to exclude 
Puerto Rico from seeking relief under chapter 9 of the Code. While Congress 
could have amended the Code to allow Puerto Rico the same measure of relief 
 
 84 Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 13-14, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 
(2016) (No. 15-233). 
 85 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241. 
 86 But see Tony Favro, Troubled US Local Government Divided over Benefits of Fiscal Control Boards, 
CITYMAYORS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.citymayors.com/finance/us-fiscal-control-boards.html (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2019) (“Control boards are not meant to be democratic, but efficient. Their focus is on re-establishing 
long-term fiscal stability, and the wishes of citizens and elected officials for particular services are often 
ignored.”).  
 87 See “A Dark Day for the People of Puerto Rico”: U.S. Senate Moves to OK “Colonial Control Board” 
(Democracy Now! television broadcast June 29, 2016), https://www.democracynow.org/2016/6/29/a_dark_ 
day_for_the_people (transcript available on Democracy Now! website). 
 88 The only Latino Senator to vote against the bill, he condemned the bill saying “PROMESA exacts a 
price far too high for relief that is far too uncertain.” See Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to 
Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS (June 30. 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-
promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741.  
 89 See “A Dark Day for the People of Puerto Rico”, supra note 87. 
 90 Senator Bob Menendez, Speech in Opposition to H.R. 5278, PROMESA (May 24, 2016) (available at 
https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-speaks-in-opposition-to-house-puerto-
rico-bill). 
 91 See generally 114 CONG. REC. H.R.162−91 (June 9, 2016) (Rep. Grijalva: “When measured against a 
perfect bill, this legislation is inadequate. When measured against the worsening crisis in Puerto Rico, this 
legislation is vitally necessary.”). 
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available to every other state, Congress failed to do so. Political arguments aside, 
PROMESA is Puerto Rico’s only option.  
Although modeled on chapters 9 and 11 of the Code,92 PROMESA is an 
entirely separate piece of legislation from the Code, enacted to assist the 
Government of Puerto Rico, including its instrumentalities, in managing its 
public finances. PROMESA contains seven “titles,” which are somewhat 
comparable to the various chapters in the Code. Title I (“Establishment and 
Organization of Oversight Board”) establishes the Financial Oversight and 
Management Board for Puerto Rico.93 Title II (“Responsibilities of Oversight 
Board”) lays out the process for developing, submitting, approving, and 
certifying fiscal plans and budgets for Puerto Rico.94 Title III (“Adjustments of 
Debts”) includes provisions that govern the adjustment or reorganization of debt 
through a “plan” proposed by the debtor,95 voted on by creditors, and confirmed 
by the court.96 Title IV (“Miscellaneous Provisions”) contains miscellaneous 
provisions, such as rules of construction97 and the right of Puerto Rico to 
determine its future political status.98 Title V (“Puerto Rico Infrastructure 
Revitalization”) creates the position of the “Revitalization Coordinator”99 to 
review and permit certain infrastructure projects within Puerto Rico.100 Title VI 
(“Creditor Collective Action”) provides a mechanism to formalize negotiated 
agreements between Puerto Rico and its creditors.101 And finally, Title VII’s 
(“Sense of Congress Regarding Permanent, Pro-growth Fiscal Reforms”) sole 
section states that “any durable solution for Puerto Rico’s fiscal and economic 
crisis should include permanent, pro-growth fiscal reforms that feature, among 
other things, a free flow of capital between possession of the United States and 
 
 92 D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R44532, THE PUERTO RICO OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND 
ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT (PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S. 2328) 15 (2016). 
 93 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1). See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2121–2129. 
 94 See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a). See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2141–2152. 
 95 While it is the norm for the debtor to file a plan of adjustment in either chapter 9 or 11 of the Code, in 
a bankruptcy proceeding under Title III of PROMESA, only the Oversight Board may file a plan of adjustment 
of the debts of the debtor. See 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a). 
 96 See AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 15. See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2161–2177. 
 97 48 U.S.C. § 2191. 
 98 48 U.S.C. § 2192 (“Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to restrict Puerto Rico’s right to determine 
its future political status . . . .”). See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2191–2200. 
 99 A person appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico to review and permit “Critical Projects,” as defined 
in § 501(2) of PROMESA. 48 U.S.C. § 2212. 
 100 See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2211–2217.  
 101 John E. Mudd, Title VI of PROMESA: Creditor Collective Action, MUDDLAW (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://johnmuddlaw.com/2017/03/09/title-vi-of-promesa-creditor-collective-action/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). 
See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2231–2232. 
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the rest of the United States.”102 This Comment focuses primarily on Title III, 
with some discussion of Titles I and II. 
B. Origins of Puerto Rico’s Economic Instability and the Birth of PROMESA 
No single factor caused Puerto Rico’s economic crisis; rather, multiple 
combined factors led to Puerto Rico’s dramatic economic decline in the last 
decade.103 Puerto Rico has been experiencing negative economic growth since 
2006, largely owing to the eroding tax base due to migration to the U.S. 
mainland and low population growth.104 Worsening economic conditions 
propelled vicious economic cycles in which migration was further accelerated 
and recovery was impeded.105 Poor fiscal management and inefficient 
government spending were also damaging factors; debts now owed to 
bondholders exceed 100 percent of Puerto Rico’s GNP.106  
In general, the Puerto Rico Office of Management and Budget oversees 
Puerto Rico’s public agencies, but it does not oversee public corporations or 
municipalities.107 Puerto Rico has an unusually large number of public 
corporations108 that play a prominent role in the economy.109 Public corporations 
provide some of the most essential public services, such as banking, public 
infrastructure, health care, and electricity.110 Puerto Rico’s weakly-regulated 
public sector is illustrated by the high rates of electricity for paying customers, 
partially attributable to the Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority’s 
(“PREPA”)111 decades-long practice of giving free electricity to all of Puerto 
Rico’s municipalities, many government-owned enterprises, and even some for-
profit businesses.112  
 
 102 48 U.S.C. § 2241. 
 103 Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: The U.S States 
and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222–23 (2017). 
 104 Stephen Kim Park & Tim R. Samples, Puerto Rico’s Debt Dilemma and Pathways Toward Sovereign 
Solvency, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 9, 15–16 (2017). 
 105 Id. at 16. 
 106 Block, supra note 103, at 219. 
 107 AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 30. 
 108 Block, supra note 103, at 224; see AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 30, 31 (“Puerto Rico’s public sector is 
composed of a Commonwealth government, some 50 public corporations . . . and municipal governments, 
among other instrumentalities.”) 
 109 AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 30. 
 110 Id. at 31. 
 111 Public corporation that provides electricity to Puerto Rico. See Block, supra note 103, at 223.  
 112 Id. at 223–24. 
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In 2015, the President of Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank 
(“GDB”), the government’s fiscal agent, testified that over the past eight years, 
outstanding public debt had increased by more than sixty percent while the 
economy had contracted by more than twenty percent.113 In fact, bonds issued 
by public corporations account for over a third of Puerto Rico’s public debt.114 
“Historically, Puerto Rico’s public corporations have either issued bonds in the 
capital markets or received financial support from GDB to cover budget deficits 
and fund capital improvements; however, the fiscal crisis has effectively 
foreclosed both sources of funding and put public corporations at risk of 
default.”115 
For years, investors flocked to purchase tax-exempt Puerto Rican bonds.116 
The favorable tax treatment of Puerto Rican bonds is defined by the Jones-
Shafroth Act of 1917, which granted U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto 
Rico117—and more relevantly—authorized the government of Puerto Rico to 
issue bonds and exempted all of the issued bonds from taxation by the U.S. 
government.118 This extraordinary U.S. tax policy encouraged investors to 
purchase more and more Puerto Rican bonds and led to excessive governmental 
borrowing that has “concealed deficits and structural shortcomings.”119 By 2014, 
all major credit-rating firms downgraded Puerto Rico’s bonds to non-investment 
grade, otherwise known as “junk” status.120  
Even on the eve of bankruptcy, Puerto Rico continued to issue its junk status 
bonds, as hedge funds piled into Puerto Rico to purchase its debts at a discount 
price with high interest rates.121 Unlike a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, in which 
the debtor is an individual or a business entity122 with contending rights against 
its creditors, the impact of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis is far more devastating on 
 
 113 Id. at 224. 
 114 Block, supra note 103, at 224. 
 115 Municipal Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act. — 
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1320, 1321 (2015). 
 116 Mary Williams Walsh, The Bonds that Broke Puerto Rico, N.Y TIMES (June 30, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/07/01/business/dealbook/the-bonds-that-broke-puerto-rico.html. 
 117 Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64–368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917). 
 118 See id. (“[A]ll bonds issued by the government of Puerto Rico . . . shall be exempt from taxation by the 
Government of the United States . . . or by any State, or by any county, municipality, or other municipal 
subdivision of any State or Territory of the United States . . . .”). 
 119 Accord Park & Samples, supra note 104, at 17. 
 120 Block, supra note 103, at 219. 
 121 Michael Corkery & Mary Williams Walsh, Message of Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Easy Bets Sometimes 
Lose, N.Y TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-
creditors-hedge-funds.html. 
 122 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109(b). 
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the debtor—Puerto Rico—because it is the people, collectively, who suffer the 
weight of the economic burden. Since 2016, Puerto Rico has drastically reduced 
its public services, benefits and employment, and increased taxes to generate 
more revenue.123 Puerto Rico’s debt crisis has resulted in closing over 150 
schools, laying off public sector workers, proposing to reduce the minimum 
wage, and forcing the population to migrate to the U.S. mainland.124 
In March of 2016, a federal district judge held that Puerto Rico is “insolvent 
and no longer able to pay its debts as they become due.”125 Puerto Rico needed 
help, but avenues of relief available to Puerto Rico were practically nonexistent. 
Seeking relief under the Code was out of the question because Congress had 
excluded Puerto Rico from seeking such relief.126 Puerto Rico then took matters 
into its own hands by enacting the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt 
Enforcement and Recovery Act (“Recovery Act”).127  
On the other side of the bankruptcy coin is the creditors’ rights against the 
debtor. When Puerto Rico attempted to pass the Recovery Act to restructure its 
public debts, many hedge fund creditors sued immediately to prevent the 
enactment of the law.128 Even some of “Wall Street’s savviest hedge funds” did 
not expect to be engaged in such a prolonged battle to protect their 
investments.129 The problem seems to be that “[m]any of the creditors think they 
are, or should be, first in line for the money,”130 thus eluding a solution to Puerto 
Rico’s debt problem. The Recovery Act was soon found to be preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and by § 903 of the Code and 
therefore struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.131 Congress acted quickly to 
enact PROMESA, giving Puerto Rico a temporary solution at best.  
 
 123 Natasha Lycia Ora Bannan, Puerto Rico’s Odious Debt: The Economic Crisis of Colonialism, 19 
CUNY L. REV. 287, 288 (2016). 
 124 Bannan, supra note 123, at 292–93. 
 125 AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 32. 
 126 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 101 L.H. 
 127 Municipal Bankruptcy—Preemption—Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act— 
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1320, 1322 (2015). The Recovery Act was meant to address the absence of recovery and reorganization 
relief for Puerto Rico’s public corporations. Therefore, Puerto Rico itself was ineligible to seek relief under the 
Recovery Act. See GOV’T DEV. BANK FOR P.R., SUMMARY OF THE PUERTO RICO PUBLIC CORPORATION DEBT 
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT 2 (July 31, 2014), http://www.gdb-pur.com/documents/ 
SummaryoftheRecoveryAct.pdf. 
 128 Bannan, supra note 123, at 288. 
 129 See Corkery & Walsh, supra note 121. 
 130 Corkery & Walsh, supra note 121. 
 131 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944. 
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Notwithstanding its unconstitutionality,132 Puerto Rico’s enactment of the 
Recovery Act was an effort to provide consensual agreements to Puerto Rico’s 
creditors and provide a statutory basis under which to restructure its debts.133 
The purpose of the Recovery Act was to “allow[] public corporations . . . to 
adjust their debts in the interest of all creditors affected thereby, provide[] 
procedures for the orderly enforcement and, if necessary, the restructuring of 
debt . . . , and maximize[] returns to all stakeholders.”134 By way of illustration, 
the Recovery Act resulted in a consensual and voluntary extension of PREPA’s 
expected principal payment to its creditors, including sixty percent of its bond 
holders, merely days after the Recovery Act was passed.135  
I. ANALYSIS 
PROMESA is the first statute of its kind enacted to address municipal 
bankruptcy in a U.S. Territory, as Puerto Rico is the first U.S. Territory to have 
defaulted. The Bankruptcy Code serves as an excellent benchmark to compare 
the efficacy of PROMESA’s procedures with respect to plan confirmation. 
When the basic provisions of the 1976 revision were incorporated into the Code, 
§ 901 of the Code (“Applicability of other sections of this title”) incorporated 
provisions of the Code’s chapters 3, 5, and 11 into chapter 9 (“Adjustment of 
debts of a municipality”) and made those provisions applicable to municipal debt 
adjustment cases.136  
Because of such wholesale incorporation, chapter 9 takes up very little space 
in the Code.137 Not surprisingly, PROMESA incorporates more than half of all 
of the sections in chapter 9 and modifies the remaining unincorporated sections 
to fit into Title III of PROMESA: Adjustment of Debts.138 This is not surprising 
 
 132 Even before the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Recovery Act unconstitutional in Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1945 (2016), one law review article correctly anticipated the 
statute would “likely [be] unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause” of the U.S. Constitution. See Municipal 
Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act. — Puerto Rico Public 
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 1323 
(2015). 
 133 Municipal Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act. — 
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1320, 1321 (2015). 
 134 Id. at 1322 (quoting 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, Statement of Motives, pt. D) (internal numbering 
omitted). 
 135 Id. at 1323. 
 136 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Code are general provisions that 
apply to all of the operative chapters, such as chapters 7, 9, and 11. AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 15. 
 137 Chapter 9 contains only twenty sections in its entirety. 
 138 Among many others, § 301 of PROMESA incorporates §§ 902, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 942, 
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because Congress probably needed a starting point to come up with new 
legislation, and the Code already spelled out what needed to be done in order for 
a municipality to file for bankruptcy. 
A. Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code 
Chapter 11 is frequently referred to as reorganization bankruptcy.139 In every 
chapter 11 case, there must be a plan of reorganization voted into acceptance by 
the debtor’s creditors and confirmed by the bankruptcy court.140 Under § 1121 
of the Code, the debtor has an exclusive period during which it may file a plan 
of reorganization.141 The proposed plan must include a classification of claims142 
and must specify how each claim or interest of a particular class will be treated 
under the plan.143 Section 1122(a) provides that if a plan places a claim or an 
interest in a particular class, then such claim or interest must be substantially 
similar to the other claims or interests of such class. Only creditors whose claims 
are “impaired” may vote on whether to accept or reject the plan.144 The Code 
defines an impaired class as a class of creditors whose legal, equitable, and 
contractual right to payment is altered in any way under the plan.145 
Under § 1126(c) of the Code, an entire class of claims is deemed to have 
accepted a plan if the plan is accepted by creditors who hold at least two-thirds 
in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims under 
§ 502.146 An accepted plan that is confirmed by the court binds the debtor and 
any creditor.147 Section 1129(a) of the Code sets out a comprehensive list of 
sixteen requirements that must be satisfied in order for the court to confirm a 
plan.148 
 
944, 945, and 946 of the Code to Title III. 
 139 Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basis, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/ 
bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics. 
 140 Id. 
 141 The debtor has 120 days to file a plan after the date of order of relief and 180 days to get the plan 
accepted after the date of order of relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(b)–(c). 
 142 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (“Claim” means “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .”). 
 143 11 U.S.C. § 1123; accord. Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basis, supra note 139. 
 144 Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basis, supra note 139. 
 145 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1). 
 146 Allowance of claims or interests. 
 147 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a). 
 148 See id. § 1129(a). 
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Much of the chapter 11 framework is incorporated into the proceedings 
under Title III (“Adjustment of Debts”) of PROMESA. Among others, § 301(a) 
of PROMESA incorporates §§ 1122, 1126(c), 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 
1129(a)(6), 1129(a)(8), and 1129(a)(10) of the Code. Generally, Title III 
includes provisions for a plan of adjustment to be proposed by the Oversight 
Board, voted on by the creditors, and confirmed by the court.149  
B. Debt Adjustment under PROMESA 
The scope of a Title III proceeding is much broader than that of a chapter 9 
proceeding under the Code.150 PROMESA gives the government of Puerto Rico 
the eligibility151 to seek bankruptcy-like relief under Title III. The term 
“Government of Puerto Rico” means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
including all of its territorial instrumentalities,152 designated by the Oversight 
Board in accordance with § 101 of PROMESA.153 At its meeting on September 
30, 2016,154 the Oversight Board designated sixty-three entities that would be 
subject to oversight under PROMESA.155 Thus any political subdivision and 
public agency designated by the Oversight Board as a covered entity, such as the 
Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”),156 is considered a territorial 
instrumentality.  
The Oversight Board consists of seven individual voting members selected 
from a list of individuals submitted by the leaders of the House of 
Representatives and Senate and appointed by the President of the United 
States.157 The Governor serves as an eighth ex officio member of the Oversight 
 
 149 AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 15. 
 150 General Guidelines to PROMESA Title III, MCCONNELL VALDÉS LLC (May 5, 2017), 
http://www.mcvpr.com/newsroom-publications-PROMESA-TitleIII. 
 151 48 U.S.C. § 2162. 
 152 Id. § 2104(11); Id. § 2104(19)(A) (“The term ‘territorial instrumentality’ means any political 
subdivision, public agency, instrumentality—including any instrumentality that is also a bank—or public 
corporation of a territory, and this term should be broadly construed to effectuate the purposes of this Act”). 
 153 48 U.S.C. § 2104(7). 
 154 The Oversight Board and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has held more than 30 meetings with 
creditor representatives to work toward achieving a consensual financial restructuring from December 2016 
through March 2017. Statement of Oversight Board in Connection with PROMESA Title III Petition at 5-6, In 
re Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 17-cv-01567-LTS (D. P.R. May 3, 2017), http://www.prd. 
uscourts.gov/promesa/sites/promesa/files/documents/1/01-2.pdf. 
 155 Id. 
 156 PREPA is one of Puerto Rico’s principal public corporations that supplies substantially all of the 
electricity consumed in Puerto Rico and “owns all transmission and distribution facilities and most of the 
generating facilities that constitute [Puerto Rico]’s electric power system[. . . .]” Id.  
 157 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(1). The President selects six members from the lists of recommendations and may 
select one member in the President’s sole discretion. See AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 7. 
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Board without voting rights.158 In general, each appointed member serves a term 
of three years159 and serves without compensation.160 Section 101(e)(2) of 
PROMESA (“Oversight Board Appointed Members”) details the 
recommendation and selection mechanisms for appointed members.161 To be 
eligible for appointment as a member of the Oversight Board, the individual 
must have “knowledge and expertise in finance, municipal bond markets, 
management, law, or the organization or operation of business or government 
. . . .”162 
PROMESA sets out specific requirements that must be met before the 
Oversight Board can certify and the court can confirm a plan of adjustment. 
Section 314(b)(7) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if the plan satisfies 
all of the seven requirements under that provision. It states, among other things, 
that the court shall confirm a plan that is certified by the Oversight Board if “the 
plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan163 certified by the Oversight 
Board under title II.”164 This is an important point because § 314(b)(7) is the 
only provision under § 314(b) that requires the court to review the Oversight 
Board’s certification determination, contributing to the assertion that 
§ 314(b)(7) creates an internal inconsistency. A distinction must be made 
between a plan of adjustment and a Fiscal Plan because only the court can 
confirm a plan while only the Oversight Board can approve a Fiscal Plan. 
Requiring the court to review whether the plan is consistent with the applicable 
Fiscal Plan is inherently contradictory. 
Each Fiscal Plan contains the phrase “submitted, approved, and certified in 
accordance with § 201 [(“Approval of Fiscal Plans”)]”165 as part of its definition. 
Section 5(10) of PROMESA defines Fiscal Plan as “a Territory Fiscal Plan or 
 
 158 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(3). 
 159 Id. § 2121(e)(5)(A). 
 160 Id. § 2121(g). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (“After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed 
administrative expenses . . . including the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate . . . .”) 
with 48 U.S.C. § 2121(g) (2012) (“Members of the Oversight Board shall serve without pay, but may receive 
reimbursement from the Oversight Board for any reasonable and necessary expenses including by reason of 
service on the Oversight Board.”).  
 161 For example, 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(2)(E) provides that an individual selected from a recommended list 
is not subject to Senate confirmation, but an individual appointed by the President who is not selected from a 
recommended list is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.  
 162 There are two requirements to be eligible for appointment. The first is discussed in this Comment. The 
second is that an individual must not be “an officer, elected official, or employee of the territorial government, 
a candidate for elected office of the territorial government, or a former elected official of the territorial 
government” prior to appointment. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(f). 
 163 See 48 U.S.C. § 2104(10).  
 164 Id. § 2174(b)(7). 
 165 Compare 48 U.S.C. § 2104(14) with 48 U.S.C. § 2104(22). 
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an Instrumentality Fiscal Plan, as applicable.” As suggested by its colloquial 
meaning, the term “Territory Fiscal Plan” means a fiscal plan for the 
Government of Puerto Rico.166 Because there are more than sixty territorial 
instrumentalities designated by the Oversight Board that are subject to oversight 
under PROMESA,167 there may be more than just a single Fiscal Plan.168  
Section 201 of PROMESA (“Approval of Fiscal Plans”) outlines a four-step 
process in the making of a Fiscal Plan: development, submission, approval, and 
certification.169 The Governor must first develop and submit a proposed Fiscal 
Plan to the Oversight Board by a specified time.170 If the Oversight Board 
determines that the Fiscal Plan satisfies all of the requirements under subsection 
(b) of the same section, then the Oversight Board must approve the proposed 
Fiscal Plan.171 Finally, if the Oversight Board has approved the Fiscal Plan, then 
it must deliver a compliance certification for the approved Fiscal Plan to the 
Governor and the Legislature.172  
The Oversight Board has the discretion to require the Governor to develop 
an Instrumentality Fiscal Plan173 that is separate from the Territory Fiscal 
Plan.174 Alternatively, it may require the Governor to include a covered 
territorial instrumentality in the Territory Fiscal Plan.175 As of February 22, 
2017, the Oversight Board has received five Instrumentality Fiscal Plans by five 
of the covered instrumentalities.176 The Oversight Board has previously certified 
 
 166 48 U.S.C. §§ 2104(14), 2104(22); see 48 U.S.C. § 2104(18) (“The term ‘territorial government’ means 
the government of a covered territory, including all covered territorial instrumentalities.”); see also 48 U.S.C. 
§ 2104(8) (“The term ‘covered territory’ means a territory for which an Oversight Board has been established 
under section 101.”). 
 167 Statement of Oversight Board in Connection with PROMESA Title III Petition at Exhibit B, In re 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 17-cv-01567-LTS (D. P.R. May 3, 2017), http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/ 
promesa/sites/promesa/files/documents/1/01-4.pdf). 
 168 For purposes of this Comment, Fiscal Plan means Territory Fiscal Plan, unless otherwise noted by the 
author. 
 169 See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a).  
 170 Id. § 2141(c)(2). 
 171 Id. § 2141(c)(3)(A). 
 172 Id. § 2141(e)(1). If the Governor fails to submit a Fiscal Plan that satisfies all of the requirements under 
subsection (b), then the Oversight Board must develop and submit a Fiscal Plan to the Governor and the 
Legislature. If this is the case, then the Fiscal Plan is deemed approved by the Governor, and the Oversight Board 
must issue a compliance certification for the Fiscal Plan to the Governor and the Legislature. See 48 U.S.C. 
§§ 2141(d)(2), (e)(2). 
 173 48 U.S.C. § 2104(14) (“The term ‘Instrumentality Fiscal Plan’ means a fiscal plan for a covered 
territorial instrumentality, designated by the Oversight Board in accordance with section 101, submitted, 
approved, and certified in accordance with section 201.”). 
 174 Id. § 2121(d)(1)(E). 
 175 Id. § 2121(d)(1)(D). 
 176 These covered instrumentalities are: Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB), Highway 
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at least three177 of the five Instrumentality Fiscal Plans, but is currently re-
evaluating revised Fiscal Plans of several covered instrumentalities.178 
In contrast, a plan of adjustment is one that only the Oversight Board may 
propose to restructure Puerto Rico’s debts, after the Oversight Board has 
determined, in its sole discretion, that the plan is consistent with the applicable 
certified Fiscal Plan.179 Like Fiscal Plans, there may be more than a single plan 
of adjustment, depending on the number of existing Fiscal Plans certified by the 
Oversight Board. Therefore, for every plan of adjustment, there must be an 
applicable Fiscal Plan with which the plan must be consistent.180 
Diagram A. Relationship between a Fiscal Plan and a plan of adjustment.  
 
 
Title III of PROMESA (“Adjustment of Debts”) is like a hybrid of chapters 
9 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.181 Like § 901 of the Code (“Applicability of 
other sections of this title”), § 301 of PROMESA (“Applicability of other laws; 
definitions”) incorporates nearly all of the Code sections that are made 
 
and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), Public Corporation for the Supervision and Insurance of Puerto Rico 
Cooperatives (COSSEC), Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA), and Puerto Rico Electric Power 
Authority (PREPA). See Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight Bd. Confirms Receipt 
of Fiscal Plans of Covered Instrumentalities (Feb. 22, 2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/. 
 177 See FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT APPROVING CERTIFIED 
FISCAL PLAN, AS REVISED (2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ (GDB’s Fiscal Plan); COSSEC, 
COSSEC FISCAL PLAN REVISED VERSION (AUG. 2017) (2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ 
(COSSEC’s Fiscal Plan); PRASA, FISCAL PLAN AMENDED TO INCORPORATE MODIFICATIONS TO CERTIFIED 
FISCAL PLAN (2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ (PRASA’s Fiscal Plan). 
 178 See Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight Bd. to Review Commonwealth, 
PREPA and PRASA Fiscal Plans (Jan. 25, 2018), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ (announcing receipt 
of the revised Fiscal Plans). 
 179 See 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a); see also 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3). 
 180 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3). 
 181 For example, § 312 of PROMESA gives the Oversight Board the exclusive authority to file a plan of 
adjustment of the debtor’s debts, whereas § 941 of the Code gives the debtor the exclusive authority to file its 
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applicable to chapter 9. In fact, seventy-seven of the seventy-eight enumerated 
Code sections that are applicable to § 901 are incorporated into Title III.182 
Moreover, the statutory goal of Title III is arguably similar to that of chapter 11: 
to get a plan of debt adjustment approved by the court.183 As is required in 
§ 1129(a) of the Code (“Confirmation of plan”), Title III requires the court to 
confirm a plan if the following seven requirements are met.184 Section 314(b) of 
PROMESA (“Confirmation”) provides that the court shall confirm the plan of 
adjustment if: 
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of title 11, made applicable 
to a case under this title by section 301 of this Act; 
(2) the plan complies with the provisions of this title; 
(3) the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action 
necessary to carry out the plan; 
(4) except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed 
to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that on the 
effective date of the plan each holder of a claim of a kind specified in 
507(a)(2) of title 11, United States Code, will receive on account of 
such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim; 
(5) any legislative, regulatory, or electoral approval necessary under 
applicable law in order to carry out any provision of the plan has been 
obtained, or such provision is expressly conditioned on such approval; 
(6) the plan is feasible and in the best interests of creditors, which shall 
require the court to consider whether available remedies under the non-
bankruptcy laws and constitution of the territory would result in a 
greater recovery for the creditors than is provided by such plan; and 
(7) the plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan certified by 
the Oversight Board under title II.185 
While all of the seven conditions must be satisfied before the court can 
confirm a plan, §§ 314(b)(1) through (b)(6) do not require the court to review 
the Oversight Board’s certification determinations. It is § 314(b)(7) that creates 
an internal inconsistency by suggesting that the court has the discretion to 
determine whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with an applicable Fiscal 
Plan. Section 314(b)(7) looks very much like § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight 
 
 182 See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). The only section that was not incorporated to § 301 of PROMESA is 
§ 301 of the Code. 
 183 EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 293. 
 184 48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(1)–(7). 
 185 Id. § 2174(b)(1)–(7) (emphasis added). 
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Board”), which states that the Oversight Board “may certify a plan of adjustment 
only if it determines, in its sole discretion, that it is consistent with the applicable 
certified Fiscal Plan.”186 The internal conflict created by § 314(b)(7) seems to 
negate the Oversight Board’s sole discretion. Furthermore, this conflict may lead 
to objections from holders of claims or interests allowed under § 502 of the Code 
(“Allowance of claims or interests”)187 who reject the Oversight Board’s plan of 
adjustment, which is essentially derived from the applicable Fiscal Plan.  
 
Table B. Section 104 and Section 314 of PROMESA. 
§ 104. Powers of Oversight 
Board. 
§ 314. Confirmation 
(j) Restructuring filings. (b) Confirmation. The court shall 
confirm the  
 (3) Condition for plans of 
adjustment. 
 plan if— 
  The Oversight Board may 
certify a plan 
 (7) the plan is consistent with the  
 of adjustment only if it 
determines, in 
 applicable Fiscal Plan certified 
by 
 its sole discretion, that it is 
consistent with the applicable 
certified Fiscal Plan.  
 the Oversight Board under title 
II [Responsibilities of 
Oversight Board]. 
If a holder of a claim or an interest brings a challenge against the Oversight 
Board, § 106(a) of PROMESA (“Treatment of actions arising from Act”) 
provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise 
arising out of this chapter, in whole or in part, shall be brought in a United States 
district court for the covered territory . . . .”188 However, subsection (e) of § 106 
declares that no U.S. district court shall have jurisdiction to review challenges 
to the Oversight Board’s certifications under PROMESA.189 Although at first 
reading it looks as though no court may review any of the Oversight Board’s 
certification determinations, subsection (e) does not preclude higher courts from 
reviewing challenges to the Oversight Board’s certifications. In fact, subsection 
(b) provides that any action against the Oversight Board under § 106(a) shall be 
“subject to review only pursuant to a notice of appeal to the applicable United 
States Court of Appeals.”190 
 
 186 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3) (emphasis added). 
 187 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (incorporated into PROMESA § 301 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) (2012))). 
 188 48 U.S.C. § 2126(a). 
 189 Id. § 2126(e). 
 190 Id. § 2126(b). 
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When a holder of a claim or an interest objects to the Oversight Board’s 
certification of a plan of adjustment, the litigant must appeal the case to a Court 
of Appeals before the case can be reviewed, since no U.S. district court has 
jurisdiction to review the Oversight Board’s certification determinations.191 In 
contrast, a civil proceeding arising under Title III, or arising in or related to cases 
under Title III, can be litigated in a district court.192  
It seems ironic that one provision permits a district court to confirm a plan, 
inter alia, if it is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, while another 
provision prohibits the district court from reviewing the Oversight Board’s 
certification determinations. The court determining whether a plan of adjustment 
is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan is effectively equivalent to negating 
one of the Oversight Board’s exclusive responsibilities laid out in § 201 
(“Approval of Fiscal Plans”) and specifically, the Oversight Board’s sole 
discretionary authority under § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”). Such 
a conflict does not arise in the Bankruptcy Code. 
C. How PROMESA Differs from the Bankruptcy Code 
PROMESA differs from the Code in one major aspect: the confirmation 
process of a plan of adjustment. Since the statutory goal of a chapter 11 case is 
to get a debt restructuring193 and repayment plan confirmed by the court,194 it 
can be argued that the statutory goal of a Title III case under PROMESA is 
similar. In the most simplistic terms, under the Code, the debtor submits a 
confirmable plan to the court and the court confirms it if all of the sixteen 
requirements listed under § 1129(a) of the Code are met.195 However, under 
PROMESA, the Oversight Board must have certified a Fiscal Plan before it can 
submit a plan of adjustment to the court. There are seven requirements in total 
that must be satisfied before the court can confirm a plan. Of the seven 
requirements under § 314(b) of PROMESA, only one section creates an internal 
inconsistency by requiring the court to review a plan that has already be certified 
by the Oversight Board: § 314(b)(7).  
A side-by-side comparison of § 314(b) with selective sections of § 1129(a) 
of the Code shows that § 314(b)(7) is the only provision that does not have a 
 
 191 48 U.S.C. § 2126(e).  
 192 Id. § 2166(a)(2) (The district courts shall have . . . original but not exclusive jurisdiction or all civil 
proceedings arising under this title . . . .”).  
 193 This Comment uses “restructuring” and “adjustment” synonymously. 
 194 EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 293. 
 195 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). 
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comparable section in the Code and therefore the only provision that creates an 
internal inconsistency. With the exception of § 314(b)(7), §§ 314(b)(1) through 
314(b)(6) do not impinge on the sole discretionary authority of the Oversight 
Board. These provisions instruct the court to perform nonconflicting tasks, as 
similarly stated under § 1129(a) of the Code. For example, as illustrated by 
Table C(1) below, § 314(b)(3) is substantially comparable to § 1129(a)(3) of the 
Code.196 Section 314(b)(5) of PROMESA broadens the scope of court and 
governmental regulatory approvals under § 1129(a)(4) and § 1129(a)(6) of the 
Code by encompassing “any legislative, regulatory, and electoral approval” 
necessary to carry out the plan.197 Additionally, PROMESA’s § 314(b)(6) 
combines the requirements of both the “Feasibility Test”198 of § 1129(a)(11) and 
the “Best Interests Test”199 of § 1129(a)(7) of the Code.  
 
Table C(1). Comparison of Section 314(b) to Selective Sections of 1129(a).200  
PROMESA Bankruptcy Code 
§ 314. Confirmation. § 1129. Confirmation of plan. 
(b) Confirmation. The court shall 
confirm the  
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only 
if all  
 plan if—  of the following requirements are 
met: 
 (1) the plan complies with the  (1) The plan complies with the 
applicable 
  provisions of title 11, made 
applicable 
  provisions of this title. 
  to a case under this title by 
section 301 
   
  of this Act;    
 (2) the plan complies with the 
provisions 
 (2) The proponent of the plan 
complies 
  of this title;   with the applicable provisions 
of this 
 
 196 However, unlike the Code, PROMESA does not require the court to determine whether a plan has been 
proposed in good faith. 
 197 Compare § 314(b)(5) of PROMESA with § 1129(a)(4) and § 1129(a)(6) of the Code.  
 198 Section 1129(a)(11) of the Code is also known as “Feasibility Test” by practitioners. See Jamie Harris, 
Feasibility: Confirming a Chapter 11 Plan, DLG (Jan. 15, 2015), http://dlgfirm.com/feasibility-confirming-a-
chapter-11-plan/. 
 199 Section 1129(a)(7) of the Code is also known as “Best Interests Test” by practitioners. See What is the 
Best Interests of Creditors Test? CULHANE MEADOWS PLLC, http://chapter11dallas.com/chapter-11-business-
bankruptcy/best-interests-creditors-test/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
 200 Some sections of the Code are purposefully arranged in the order of relevance, and not arranged in 
numerical order, to demonstrate their similarity to the corresponding section in PROMESA.  
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     title. 
 (3) the debtor is not prohibited 
by law 
 (3) The plan has been proposed in 
good 
  from taking any action 
necessary to 
  faith and not by any means 
forbidden 
  carry out the plan;   by law. 
 (4) except to the extent that the 
holder of 
 (9) Except to the extent that the 
holder of  
  a particular claim has 
agreed to a 
  a particular claim has agreed to 
a 
  different treatment of such 
claim, the 
  different treatment of such 
claim, the 
  plan provides that on the 
effective date 
  plan provides that— 
  of the plan each holder of a 
claim of a 
  (A) with respect to a claim of a 
kind 
  kind specified in 507(a)(2) 
of title 11, 
   specified in section 
507(a)(2) . . . 
  United States Code, will 
receive on 
   of this title, on the effective 
date 
  account of such claim cash 
equal to 
   of the plan, the holder of 
such 
  the allowed amount of such 
claim; 
   claim will receive on 
account of 
      such claim cash equal to 
the  
      allowed amount of such 
claim . . . 
 (5) any legislative, regulatory, 
or electoral 
 (4) Any payment made or to be 
made by 
  approval necessary under 
applicable 
  the proponent, by the 
debtor . . . for 
  law in order to carry out any 
provision 
  services or for costs and 
expenses in 
  of the plan has been 
obtained, or such 
  or in connection with the 
case . . . has 
  provisions is expressly 
conditioned on 
  been approved by, or is subject 
to the 
  such approval;   approval of, the court as 
reasonable. 
    (6) Any governmental regulatory 
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     commission with jurisdiction, 
after 
     confirmation of the plan, over 
the rates 
     of the debtor has approved any 
rate 
     change provided for in the 
plan, or 
     such rate change is expressly  
     conditioned on such approval. 
 (6) the plan is feasible and in 
the best 
 (11) Confirmation of the plan is 
not likely  
  interests of creditors, which 
shall 
  to be followed by the 
liquidation, or 
  require the court to consider 
whether 
  the need for further financial 
  available remedies under the   reorganization . . . 
  non-bankruptcy laws and 
constitution 
 (7) With respect to each impaired 
class of 
  of the territory would result 
in a  
  claims or interests— 
  greater recovery for the 
creditors 
  (A) each holder of a claim or 
interest 
  than is provided by such 
plan; and 
   of such class— 
      (i) has accepted the plan; or 
      (ii) will receive or retain 
under 
       the plan on account of 
such 
       claim or interest 
property of a 
       value, as of the 
effective date 
       of the plan, that is not 
less than 
       the amount that such 
holder 
       would so receive or 
retain if  
       the debtor were 
liquidated  
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       under chapter 7 . . . on 
such date . . . 
 (7) the plan is consistent with 
the 
     
  applicable Fiscal Plan 
certified by the 
     
  Oversight Board under title 
II. 
     
In this respect, PROMESA’s most significant difference from the Code is 
the establishment and creation of the Oversight Board.201 While the Code 
reserves the right to file a plan of reorganization exclusively to the debtor,202 
PROMESA designates that exclusive right to the Oversight Board.203 And the 
Oversight Board must certify a proposed plan before the federal district court 
for the covered territory can confirm it.204 In sum, the Oversight Board has the 
sole discretionary power to certify a plan,205 and neither the Governor of Puerto 
Rico (“Governor”) nor its Legislature206 can “exercise any control, supervision, 
oversight, or review over the Oversight Board or its activities . . . .”207  
Under PROMESA, there are at least two plans that need to be approved by 
two different authorities before the court can confirm a plan of adjustment for 
the debts of the debtor: (1) the applicable Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight 
Board208; and (2) the plan of adjustment confirmed by the court. Whereas a 
single confirmable plan is required under either of chapter 9 and 11 of the Code 
for the reorganization of an entity’s debts, PROMESA provides that a plan of 
adjustment must be consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan in order for the 
court to confirm it.209 The problem is that this language seems to negate the 
Oversight Board’s sole discretionary authority, which is evidenced by the 
language in § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”).210  
 
 201 Title I of PROMESA establishes a Financial Oversight and Management Board. 48 U.S.C. §2121(b)(1) 
(“A Financial Oversight and Management Board is hereby established for Puerto Rico.”) 
 202 11 U.S.C. § 941; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 941.02. 
 203 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a). Contra 11 U.S.C. § 941 (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the 
debtor’s debts.”). 
 204 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(2)(B). 
 205 Id. § 2124(j)(3).  
 206 Id. § 2104(15) (meaning “the legislative body responsible for enacting the laws of a covered 
territory.”). 
 207 Id. § 2128(a)(1). 
 208 See id. § 2141. 
 209 Id. § 2174(b)(7). 
 210 23 U.S.C. § 104(j)(3) (“The Oversight Board may certify a plan of adjustment only if it determines, in 
its sole discretion, that it is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.”). 
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1.  Section 314(b)(7) Gives Meaningless Power to Courts 
To resolve the meaning of a statutory provision, a court begins its analysis 
with the language of the statute itself.211 As currently written, § 314(b)(7) 
necessarily prompts the court to review an applicable Fiscal Plan, which by 
definition, has already been “submitted, approved, and certified, in accordance 
with section 201.”212 This is no less than a challenge against the Oversight 
Board’s certification determinations—and if so—the district court has no 
jurisdiction to review such a challenge.213 But § 306(a)(1) of PROMESA 
(“Jurisdiction”) provides that the district courts shall have original and exclusive 
subject matter jurisdiction of all cases under Title III, unless Congress confers 
exclusive jurisdiction on a court, or a civil proceeding arising under, in, or 
related to cases under Title III.214 In the course of reviewing whether a plan of 
adjustment complies with the requirements set out in § 314(b) (“Confirmation”), 
the presiding district court would almost certainly run afoul of § 104(j)(3) 
(“Powers of Oversight Board”). 
A simple rephrasing of the language by applying logic further reveals that 
§ 314(b)(7) is superfluous. Section 314(b)(7) provides that the court shall 
confirm the plan if “the plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan 
certified by the Oversight Board under title II.”215 In comparison, § 104(j)(3) of 
PROMESA reads, “[t]he Oversight Board may certify a plan of adjustment only 
if it determines, in its sole discretion, that it is consistent with the applicable 
certified Fiscal Plan.”216 Note that the word, “may” should really be read as 
“shall,” because §§ 104(j)(1)–(2) provide that the Oversight Board “must” 
certify the submission of a plan of adjustment.  
 
Table C(2). Section 104(j) and Section 314(b)(7) of PROMESA. 
§ 104. Powers of Oversight Board. § 314. Confirmation. 
(j) Restructuring filings. (b) Confirmation. The court shall 
confirm the 
  
(1) In general.—Subject to 
paragraph (3), 
 plan if— 
. . . 
 
 211 See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1946. 
 212 See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2104(10), (14), (22). 
 213 Id. § 2126(e).  
 214 See 48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(2); see also 48 U.S.C. § 2168(a) (“For cases in which the debtor is a territory, 
the Chief Justice of the United States shall designate a district court judge to sit by designation to conduct the 
case.”). 
 215 48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(7). 
 216 Id. § 2124(j)(3). 
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  before taking an action 
described in paragraph (2) on 
behalf of a debtor or potential 
debtor in a case under title III, 
the Oversight Board must 
certify the action. 
 (7) the plan is consistent with 
the 
 applicable Fiscal Plan 
certified by the Oversight 
Board under title II 
[Responsibilities of Oversight 
Board]. 
 (2) Actions described.—The 
actions  
 
  referred to in paragraph (1) 
are— 
 
  (A) the filing of a petition; or  
  (B) the submission or 
modification of 
 
   a plan of adjustment.  
 (3) Condition for plans of 
adjustment. 
 
  The Oversight Board may 
certify a plan 
  
 of adjustment only if it 
determines, in 
 its sole discretion, that it is 
consistent with the applicable 
certified Fiscal Plan (emphasis 
added).  
As a matter of logic, the phrase “only if” in § 104(j)(3) indicates that words 
that come after the phrase are a necessary condition to that antecedent. Thus 
§ 104(j)(3) can be translated as follows: If the Oversight Board has certified a 
plan of adjustment, then it must have determined, in its sole discretion, that the 
plan is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan. 
 




“The Oversight Board may certify a plan of 






Before submitting a plan of adjustment on behalf of the 
debtor in a case under title III, the Oversight Board must 
certify the action.  
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The Oversight Board shall certify a plan of adjustment . . . 
Rest of 
§ 104(j)(3)  
original: 
 
“. . . only if it determines, in its sole discretion, that it is 
consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.” 









If the Oversight Board has certified a plan of adjustment, 
then it must have determined, in its sole discretion, that 
the plan is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal 
Plan. 
 
Section 314(b)(7) reads, “[t]he court shall confirm [the plan of adjustment] 
if the plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight 
Board under [title] II.”217 When § 314(b)(7) is rephrased so that the if-clause 
precedes the then-clause, then the revised sentence would read as follows: If the 
plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, then the court 
shall confirm the plan.  
 
Table C(4). Breakdown of Section 314(b)(7) of PROMESA. 
§ 314(b)(7) 
original: 
“The court shall confirm the plan [of adjustment] if the 
plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan certified 
by the Oversight Board under title II.” 
Rephrased to 






If the plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable 
Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight Board under title II, 
then the court shall confirm the plan. 
 
 217 48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(7). 
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PROMESA gives the Oversight Board the sole discretion to determine 
whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan.218 By 
definition, no other entity can make this determination. The if-clause of 
§ 314(b)(7) can be translated as follows: “if the plan of adjustment [determined 
by the Oversight Board, in its sole discretion] is consistent with the applicable 
Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight Board under title II . . .” then the court 
shall confirm the plan. Section 314(b)(7)’s current language is confusing 
because it seems to suggest that the court shall determine whether the plan of 
adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, when in fact, only the 
Oversight Board has the authority to make this determination.  
When a certified plan of adjustment exists in the first place, it means that the 
plan is already consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan because by virtue of 
§ 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”), the Oversight Board has already 
determined that it is so. If § 314(b)(7) were amended to improve clarity, it would 
read as follows: The court shall confirm the plan of adjustment. Period. This 
amended language is essentially the preamble to § 314(b) that precedes the seven 
requirements that must be satisfied before the court can confirm a plan of 
adjustment.219 Consequently, § 314(b)(7) is superfluous and serves no unique 
function in PROMESA. 
 
Table C(5). Application of PROMESA’s Section 104(j)(3) to Section 314(b)(7). 
Simplification § 104(j)(3) translated: § 314(b)(7) rephrased: 
If A, then B. If the Oversight Board has 
certified a plan of 
adjustment, then it must 
have determined, in its sole 
discretion, that the plan is 
consistent with the 
applicable certified Fiscal 
Plan. 
If the plan of adjustment is 
consistent with the 
applicable Fiscal Plan 
under title II, then the court 
shall confirm the plan. 
   
If A, then B. 
If B, then C. 
If a plan of adjustment 
exists, then it is consistent 
with the applicable Fiscal 
Plan.  
If a plan of adjustment 
exists, then it is consistent 
with the applicable Fiscal 
Plan. If the plan of 
adjustment is consistent 
with the applicable Fiscal 
 
 218 See 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3).  
 219 See id. § 2174(b).  
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Plan, then the court shall 
confirm the plan. 
   
If A, then C.  If a plan of adjustment 
exists, then the court shall 
confirm the plan. 
A.   
Therefore C.  The court shall confirm the 
plan of adjustment. 
One of the three most important tools federal courts use to interpret statutes 
is text.220 The U.S. Supreme Court follows as many as 187 canons of 
construction to interpret statutes.221 In a famous law review article, the late 
Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn has suggested that “there are two 
opposing canons on almost every point,”222 therefore canons can be used readily 
to cancel each other out.223 One canon of construction that may be invoked 
against this author’s textual deconstruction of § 314(b)(7) is the rule against 
surplusage. This rule stands for the proposition that one section of a statute 
should not be construed in a manner that renders another section superfluous.224 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s preference for avoiding surplusage is not 
absolute.225 Words must be read “in their context and with a view to their place 
in the overall statutory scheme.”226 
In the context of PROMESA, it is quite clear that Congress conferred upon 
the Oversight Board a broad range of exclusive powers and responsibilities, 
including the debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan of adjustment, normally 
reserved to the debtor under chapter 9 of the Code.227 The phrase, “sole 
discretion,” describing the Oversight Board’s scope of power, appears twenty 
 
 220 The other two are purpose and legislative history. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, 
LEGISLATION AND THE REGULATORY STATE 91 (2015).  
 221 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review: The New Textualism and Normative Canons, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 541 (2013). 
 222 Id. (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
about How States are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)). 
 223 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 912 (2016). 
 224 Id. at 923 n.51. 
 225 See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 
U.S. 84 (2001)); see also Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 384 (2013) (“The canon against surplusage 
is not an absolute rule”)). 
 226 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 592 U.S. 120 
(2000)). 
 227 See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s debts.”). 
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five times throughout PROMESA.228 As elucidated by the simple logical 
restructuring of the sentences in § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”) and 
§ 314(b)(7) (“Confirmation”), the rest of PROMESA’s relevant provisions 
strongly support the inference that Congress did not intend to give the court 
authority to review whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with an applicable 
Fiscal Plan. 
2. Section 314(b)(7) Negates Oversight Board’s Sole Discretionary 
Authority  
Title II of PROMESA (“Responsibilities of Oversight Board”) provides for 
the Oversight Board’s broad range of responsibilities concerning the approval 
of Fiscal Plans. A “Fiscal Plan,”229 as used throughout PROMESA, is either a 
Territory Fiscal Plan230 or an Instrumentality Fiscal Plan.231 A requirement that 
is common to both definitions is that a Fiscal Plan must be “submitted, approved, 
and certified in accordance with section 201.”232 This is important because one 
of the requirements that must be satisfied before a court can confirm a plan of 
adjustment is that the plan must be consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan 
certified by the Oversight Board under Title II.233  
The certification process is almost entirely the Oversight Board’s 
responsibility. After the Oversight Board delivers a notice of schedule to the 
Governor, the Governor must develop and submit a proposed Fiscal Plan to the 
Oversight Board.234 As an ex officio member of the Oversight Board without 
any voting rights,235 the Governor plays a subordinate role in supporting the 
Oversight Board’s fulfillment of its responsibilities.236 The Oversight Board 
 
 228 The author has counted the number of times the phrase appears in PROMESA. 
 229 48 U.S.C. § 2104(10).  
 230 48 U.S.C. § 2104(22) (meaning a fiscal plan for a territorial government, which are Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the U.S. Virgin Islands, as defined in 
§ 5(20)). 
 231 48 U.S.C. § 2104(14) (“The term ‘Instrumentality Fiscal Plan’ means a fiscal plan for a covered 
territorial instrumentality . . . .” Territorial instrumentality means “any political subdivision, public agency, 
instrumentality—including any instrumentality that is also a bank—or public corporation of a territory . . . .” as 
defined in PROMESA § 5(19)(A) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 2104(19)(A) (2012)).  
 232 See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2104(10), (14), (22).  
 233 Id. § 2174(b)(7).  
 234 Id. § 2141(c)(2). The flipside of this process is the Oversight Board’s development and submission of 
a fiscal plan to the Governor and the Legislature, if the Governor fails to submit a fiscal plan to the Oversight 
Board. In this scenario, the proposed fiscal plan is deemed approved by the Governor. See 48 U.S.C. 
§§ 2141(d)(2), (e)(2). 
 235 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(3). 
 236 See id. § 2141(c)(2) (“The Governor shall submit to the Oversight Board any proposed Fiscal Plan 
required by the Oversight Board . . . .”). 
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then reviews any proposed Fiscal Plan against the list of fourteen requirements 
provided in § 201(b) (“Requirements for Approval of Fiscal Plans”) and 
approves the Fiscal Plan if it determines, in its sole discretion, that all of the 
requirements are satisfied.237 A proposed Fiscal Plan must satisfy all of the 
following requirements: 
(A) provide for estimates of revenues and expenditures in 
conformance with agreed accounting standards and be based on−  
(i) applicable laws; or 
(ii) specific bills that require enactment in order to reasonably 
achieve the projections of the Fiscal Plan; 
(B) ensure the funding of essential public services; 
(C) provide adequate funding for public pension systems; 
(D) provide for the elimination of structural deficits; 
(E) for fiscal years covered by a Fiscal Plan in which a stay under titles 
III or IV is not effective, provide for a debt burden that is sustainable; 
(F) improve fiscal governance, accountability, and internal controls; 
(G) enable the achievement of fiscal targets; 
(H) create independent forecasts of revenue for the period covered by 
the Fiscal Plan; 
(I) include a debt sustainability analysis; 
(J) provide for capital expenditures and investments necessary to 
promote economic growth; 
(K) adopt appropriate recommendations submitted by the Oversight 
Board under section 205(a); 
(L) include such additional information as the Oversight Board deems 
necessary; 
(M) ensure that assets, funds, or resources of a territorial 
instrumentality are not loaned to, transferred to, or otherwise used for 
the benefit of a covered territory or another covered territorial 
instrumentality of a covered territory, unless permitted by the 
constitution of the territory, an approved plan of adjustment under title 
III, or a Qualifying Modification approved under title VI; and 
 
 237 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3).  
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(N) respect the relative lawful priorities or lawful liens, as may be 
applicable, in the constitution, other laws, or agreements of a covered 
territory or covered territorial instrumentality in effect prior to the date 
of enactment of this Act [June 30, 2016].238 
If the Oversight Board approves the Governor’s proposed Fiscal Plan, then 
it must deliver a compliance certification to the Governor and the Legislature.239  
Once the Oversight Board certifies a Fiscal Plan, it can then file a plan of 
adjustment240 that is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.241 Even 
before the Oversight Board can submit a plan of adjustment, it must certify the 
act of submission itself242 as provided in § 206 (“Oversight Board duties related 
to restructuring”).243 PROMESA requires the Oversight Board to perform one 
certification after another and manifests Congress’s intent to give the Oversight 
Board the ultimate decision-making power.244 
Against this backdrop, § 314(b)(7) seems like a drafting error that 
inadvertently negates the Oversight Board’s sole discretionary authority. 
Suppose a court finds a particular plan of adjustment inconsistent with an 
applicable certified Fiscal Plan and thereby chooses not to confirm the plan. 
What does this mean? Has the court run afoul of § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of 
Oversight Board”) by encroaching on the Oversight Board’s sole discretionary 
power to certify a plan of adjustment?  
Fourteen requirements must be satisfied before the Oversight Board can 
approve and certify a proposed Fiscal Plan,245 and PROMESA delegates the 
Oversight Board the sole authority to review a proposed Fiscal Plan.246 
Almost247 every single requirement under § 201(b) (“Requirements for 
 
 238 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b). 
 239 Id. § 2141(e)(1).  
 240 Id. § 2172(a).  
 241 Id. § 2124(j)(3).  
 242 See id. § 2124(j)(1)–(2).  
 243 Oversight Board duties related to restructuring. Section 206(a) of PROMESA (codified as amended at 
48 U.S.C. § 2146(a)) sets out the requirements for restructuring certification. 
 244 See 48 U.S.C. § 2146(b) (A vote of no fewer than five members of the Oversight Board is required to 
issue a restructuring certification.). 
 245 Id. 
 246 See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3).  
 247 This author qualifies the requirements as “almost” all finance-related because reasonable persons could 
disagree that § 201(b)(1)(K) (requiring that the Fiscal Plan adopt appropriate recommendations submitted by the 
Oversight Board under § 205(a)); 201(b)(1)(L) (requiring that the Fiscal Plan include such additional 
information as the Oversight Board deems necessary); and § 201(b)(1)(N) (requiring that the Fiscal Plan respect 
the relative lawful priorities or lawful liens in effect prior to the date of PROMESA’s enactment) are arguably 
not finance-related. 
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Approval of Fiscal Plans”) requires the performance of in-depth financial 
analyses to ensure that a Fiscal Plan will “provide a method to achieve fiscal 
responsibility and access to the capital markets . . . .”248 That an individual must 
have “knowledge and expertise in finance . . . .”249 to be eligible for appointment 
as an Oversight Board member—corroborates the fact that approving and 
certifying a Fiscal Plan requires extensive knowledge in finance. When the 
Oversight Board decides that a proposed Fiscal Plan is worthy of approval, at 
that point the Oversight Board has already completed its analyses and 
determined that each requirement has been met.  
If the court is to ascertain whether a plan satisfies each requirement, the court 
must necessarily engage in a reviewing process. For example, § 314(b)(6) 
requires that the plan of adjustment must be “feasible and in the best interests of 
creditors, which shall require the court to consider whether available remedies 
under the non-bankruptcy laws and constitution of the territory would result in 
a greater recovery for the creditors than is provided by such plan . . . .” The court 
has to review at least two things: (1) whether the plan is feasible; and (2) whether 
the plan is in the best interests of creditors. By the same reasoning, § 314(b)(7) 
permits the court to determine whether the plan is consistent with the applicable 
Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight Board, when in fact, district courts are 
prohibited from reviewing the Oversight Board’s certification determinations.  
D. Development of Fiscal Plans Since PROMESA’s Passage 
After Congress voted to pass PROMESA, then-President Barack Obama 
appointed the seven members of the Oversight Board on August 31, 2016.250 
Former Governor Alejandro García Padilla’s initial Fiscal Plan was rejected by 
the Oversight Board for lack of debt sustainability analyses and returned to the 
Governor for revision with a deadline of December 15, 2016.251 In March 2017, 
the Oversight Board approved the revised Fiscal Plan proposed by the 
succeeding Governor Ricardo Rosselló.252 By this time, members of the 
Oversight Board had unanimously approved and certified the Oversight Board’s 
voluntary petition under Title III before the U.S. District Court for the District 
 
 248 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1).  
 249 Id. § 2121(f). 
 250 CTR. FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, P.R. IN CRISIS TIMELINE 9 (2017), https://centropr.hunter. 
cuny.edu/sites/default/files/PDF_Publications/Puerto-Rico-Crisis-Timeline-2017.pdf. 
 251 Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman & Member, Oversight Bd., to García  
Padilla, Governor of P.R. (Nov. 23, 2016) (available at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/); see also CTR. 
FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, supra note 250, at 10. 
 252 Id. 
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of Puerto Rico, on behalf of Puerto Rico.253 United States Chief Justice John 
Roberts appointed U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern 
District of New York to oversee the Title III case.254 The Oversight Board has 
since certified several Title III filings by Puerto Rico’s covered 
instrumentalities.255 
After Hurricane Maria swooped through the Caribbean island in September 
of 2017, knocking out the island’s entire power grid,256 Puerto Rico incurred as 
much as $95 billion of damages in additional debt,257 on top of its $123 billion 
debt.258 The devastating storm has exacerbated Puerto Rico’s already-crippled 
economy and further obscured its road to economic recovery.259 PREPA faces 
millions of additional dollars in debt, on top of its more than $ 11 billion of total 
liabilities in fiscal year 2017.260 This is a serious liquidity problem not just for 
PREPA but for Puerto Rico, as PREPA is a key part of Puerto Rico’s debt 
reconstruction.261 
Puerto Rico’s certified Fiscal Plan—which was premised on no federal 
funding—was no longer workable in the face of the new challenges. In the 
immediate days following the catastrophic storm, the Oversight Board 
authorized the Governor to re-allocate up to $1 billion of the Government’s 
 
 253 See Press Release, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Oversight Board 
Certifies Title III Filings (May 3, 2017) (available at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/); see CTR. FOR 
PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, supra note 250, at 13. 
 254 CTR. FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, supra note 250, at 13; accord General Guidelines to PROMESA 
Title III, MCCONNELL VALDÉS LLC (May 5, 2017), http://www.mcvpr.com/newsroom-publications-
PROMESA-TitleIII. 
 255 See generally FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BOARD. FOR P.R., https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019) (listing documents of the Oversight Board’s unanimous written consents to Title III 
filings by covered instrumentalities, including PREPA and PRHTA).  
 256 See Steven Mufson, Hurricane Maria has Dealt a Heavy Blow to Puerto Rico’s Bankrupt Utility and 
Fragile Electric Grid, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/09/20/puerto-ricos-power-company-was-already-bankrupt-then-hurricane-maria-hit/ 
?utm_term=.f2f60aef92c2. 
 257 Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico to Redraw Plan for Ending Debt Crisis Due to Storm, BLOOMBERG 
MARKETS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-31/puerto-rico-to-redraw-plan-
for-ending-debt-crisis-due-to-storm; see Yalda Hakim, Puerto Rico’s Hard Road to Recovery After Hurricane 
Maria, BBC NEWS (Nov.10 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41929287 (“This is the largest 
[Federal Emergency Management Agency] response in the Caribbean, the most catastrophic event in Puerto 
Rico and probably in the U.S.”). 
 258 See Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-puerto-rico-debt-crisis/. 
 259 Kaske, supra note 257. 
 260 Alvin Baez, Puerto Rico Unveils Revised Fiscal Plan, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/01/25/puerto-rico-unveils-revised-fiscal-plan-no-debt-service-payments-for-the-next-5-years.html. 
 261 See Mufson, supra note 256. 
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Territory Budget262 to respond to the damages caused by Hurricane Maria263 and 
urged Congress to provide the maximum amount of federal assistance.264 
Creditors were expected to concede to even steeper cut-backs on their debt 
repayments than previously anticipated.265 On January 25, 2018, Governor 
Rosselló submitted a revised Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth to the Oversight 
Board.266 After a series of revisions, the Oversight Board certified the latest 
revised Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on October 23, 
2018.267 The Oversight Board has also certified several revised Instrumentality 
Fiscal Plans, including the Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing 
Corporation (“COFINA”) and the Fiscal Plan for PREPA.268 COFINA is the 
only instrumentality to have its plan of adjustment certified by the Oversight 
Board, and a confirmation hearing is scheduled to be heard at the District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico on January 16, 2019.269 
CONCLUSION 
While a Fiscal Plan draws the big picture for a long-term fiscal and economic 
growth of a target entity, a plan of adjustment is narrower in focus as it provides 
for the treatment of various classes of creditors’ claims or interests against the 
entity. Under PROMESA, only the Oversight Board may file a plan of 
adjustment on the debtor’s behalf.270 It is the Oversight Board’s exclusive 
responsibility to evaluate whether a proposed Fiscal Plan satisfies all of the 
fourteen requirements set out in § 201(b) (“Requirements for Approval of Fiscal 
Plans”). Without a certified Fiscal Plan in place, no plan of adjustment can exist.  
The road to certifying a Fiscal Plan is complex and requires expertise in 
finance and debt analyses. There is more than a single Fiscal Plan and 
consequently more than a single plan of adjustment that must be consistent with 
an applicable Fiscal Plan. An unsatisfactory Fiscal Plan is sent back to the 
 
 262 48 U.S.C. § 2104(21) (“The term ‘Territory Budget’ means a budget for a territorial government 
submitted, approved, and certified in accordance with section 202.”).  
 263 Letter from Oversight Board, to Ricardo Rosselló, Governor of P.R. (Sept. 21, 2017) (available at 
https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/).  
 264 Id. 
 265 See Kaske, supra note 257. 
 266 Baez, supra note 260. The revised Fiscal Plan called for zero debt service payments to its creditors 
over the next five years. 
 267 Letter from Oversight Board, to Ricardo Rosselló, Governor of P.R. (Oct. 24, 2018). 
 268 Id.; FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BOARD FOR P.R., UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT CERTIFYING 
COFINA’S FISCAL PLAN (2018) (available at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/). 
 269 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (17-03283), PRIME CLERK, https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico/ 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
 270 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a). 
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Governor with a notice of violation that includes the Oversight Board’s 
recommendations for revisions to a proposed Fiscal Plan.271 Unexpected factors, 
such as the catastrophic Hurricane Maria and the inadvertent drafting error 
introduced by § 314(b)(7), delay the certification process—and ultimately 
hinder the debtor’s efforts toward getting a plan confirmed. Because § 314(b)(7) 
gives courts meaningless power and negates the Oversight Board’s sole 
discretion as provided in PROMESA, it should be removed from § 314(b) to 
maximize the efficiency of the bankruptcy system.  
The Oversight Board was not designed to be in place forever. PROMESA 
provides that the Oversight Board shall terminate if the Oversight Board certifies 
that the applicable territorial government has adequate means to sustain its 
markets and budgets for at least four consecutive fiscal years.272 The Oversight 
Board exists for the purpose of providing a method for Puerto Rico to achieve 
fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.273 In PROMESA, 
Congress effectuated its intent to delegate broad powers to the Oversight Board 
with respect to Puerto Rico’s fiscal policies. If the court steps in to review 
whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, it 
would be a direct challenge against the Oversight Board’s sole discretion granted 
to it pursuant to § 104(j)(3). While any challenges against the Oversight Board’s 
certifications must be brought in the district court for the covered territory,274 it 
is troubling to imagine that a district court would bring an action against the 
Oversight Board in its own court.275 Confusion over this internal inconsistency 
will almost certainly delay Puerto Rico’s debt adjustment process. 
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 271 See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3). 
 272 See id. § 2149.  
 273 Id. § 2121(a). 
 274 Id. § 2126(a). 
 275 District courts have the original and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of all cases under Title III. 
See 48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(1). 
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